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Trading Income and Bank Charter Value during the Financial Crisis:
Does Derivatives Dealer Designation Matter?

1. Introduction
In the banking industry, managers are tasked with a dual objective of managing the
various sources of risk inherent in their business while maximizing shareholder value.
Bank managers must balance between these objectives since increases in shareholder
returns usually come at a cost of increased risk. Over the last few decades, we have
witnessed rising popularity in the bank use of derivatives to manage various forms of risk
they are exposed to including interest rate, foreign exchange and credit risk. A derivatives
security is commonly defined as a financial security whose payoff is tied to (or derived
from) a previously issued security. Derivative securities (e.g. swaps, futures, forwards,
option contracts, among others) generally involves an agreement between two parties to
exchange a standard quantity of an asset or cash flow at a predetermined price and an
agreed upon future date. Thus, derivatives involve the buying and selling, or transfer of
risk.
According to Sinkey and Carter (2000), banks participate in the derivatives market as
dealers, end users or both. They also state that as end users, banks can use derivatives
either to hedge against unexpected changes interest rates, foreign exchange rates, or
commodity prices or to speculate on the future movement of these economic variables.
These authors also note that only the largest banks act as dealers by providing over- thecounter (OTC) derivative products to nonfinancial firms and other banks. It is also well
documented that derivative activities are centered in a handful of large banks. Per the
2011Q4 bank trading and derivatives activities report prepared by Office the Comptroller
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of the Currency (OCC), there are five large commercial banks that account for 96% of
all banking industry notional amounts of derivatives while 99% of the total is held by the
top 25 banks. The industry concentration among the dealer banks as measured by the
Herfindahl Index had remained well above the 30% level between 2001Q4 and 2008Q4,
and since 2011Q4 has settled modestly below the 25% level as seen in Figure 1.
Conventional wisdom suggests that higher levels of industry concentration allow for
monopolist behavior which is a source of market power that may favorably impact a
bank’s charter value.
The potential for significant fee income generation has led banks to participate in
derivative markets to offer risk management services to its corporate clients. This trend
has grown over the last few decades with fees incomes representing an important revenue
source to help offset flat to declining spreads earned on traditional lending business. It is
clear that a select group of large banks, namely those that focus on derivative activities,
earn far more fee income than those banks that are not set up to participate in the
derivatives market. It is also known that dealing and trading in derivative products
through a bank profit center requires substantial investment in financial, human,
intellectual and reputational capital. The substantial required capital investment poses a
barrier to entry into the derivative market making activity for the smaller banks
Some researchers claim that off-balance-activities, including derivatives trading,
have become a potential source of bank charter value for the large banks (e.g. Furlong
and Kwan, 2006). Derivative trading not only generates important fee income to the
banks but provides opportunities for bankers to add value through cross-selling
opportunities and enhanced customer relationships. Based on the implied negative
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relationship between risk and charter value, derivative activities used for hedging
purposes should favorably impact bank charter value. Prior to the financial crisis,
Brunnermeier et al. (2012) state that banks have increasingly earned a higher proportion
of their profits from non-interest income (including income from derivatives trading)
compared to interest income. Therefore, it would seem interesting to explore the linkage
between derivative dealer bank behavior and charter value. The term charter value is
broadly defined as the expected present value of a firm’s economic rents. In a banking
context, Palia and Porter (2004) refer to charter value as the present value of the bank’s
future economic profits as a going concern. The bank’s profit potential in turn is highly
linked to customer relationships, efficiency and market power. Through the issuance of
an approved bank charter, banks have the ability to operate in a regulatory environment
that may curtail external competition from non-bank sources. Banking legislation that
curbs such competition from non-bank sources provides market power to approved banks
thereby creating value.
The continued evolution in derivative securities, and the significant trading losses
recorded during the 2007-2009 financial crises, has drawn attention to bank regulators,
law makers and the investor public. For our sample of 27 bank holding companies
(BHC), aggregate trading losses from 2007Q3 to 2008Q4 totaled U.S. $73.6 billion1. The
collapse of the largest investment banks who were the market makers of traded securities,
the originators of new securities, and producers of derivative products also placed the
1

The quarterly trading losses reported during the crisis period by our sample BHCs are in sharp contrast with the
cumulative trading incomes reported during the rise of the housing boom period. From 2003Q3-2004Q4, cumulative
trading incomes for our BHC sample totaled U.S. $50.1billion. Over the full sample period, aggregate trading
incomes were reported in 37 of the 43 quarters resulting in U.S. $506.9 billion in cumulative trading income. More
recently, the WSJ May 11, 2012 article “J.P. Morgan’s $2 Billion Blunder” by Fitzpatrick, Zuckerman and
Rappaport reported on the large trading losses posted by the bank during 2012Q2 resulting from bad investment
decisions made on credit default swaps (CDS) by the bank’s risk management group.
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derivative markets in the spotlight. The severity of bank losses reported during the 20072009 financial crisis, including losses from proprietary trading that involved derivative
activities, ultimately led to the Dodd Frank Act of 2010 that contains the Volker Rule.
From a broad perspective, the attention to the use of derivatives by banks is further
attributed to the dramatic increase in the gross notional value of derivatives that far
exceed the increase in BHC assets as depicted in Figure 2. It is important to examine the
large dealer banks since Brunnermeier et al. (2012) point out that systemic risk is higher
for banks with higher non-interest income2 to interest income ratios, a condition that is
common with large dealer banks. They suggest that activities that are not traditionally
linked with banks such as deposit taking and lending are associated with a larger
contribution to systemic risk.
This study investigates the following research questions: 1) Does trading income
contribute to BHC charter value? 2) Does derivatives dealer designation change the
impact of trading incomes on BHC charter value? and 3) Did trading incomes help
support BHC net operating revenues during the 2007-2009 financial crises? This research
is important since substantial derivative exposure with respect to BHC assets and capital
can lead to disruptive consequences in the event of unfavorable market movements or
increases in counterparty risk. Failure by a large complex financial institution, such as
those included in our sample, may produce spillover effects across the financial system
which could lead to negative repercussions on the economy and the business community.
The timeliness of the research is appropriate given the fragility of the U.S. economy that
2

Brunnermeier et al. (2012) decompose non-interest income into two components: 1) trading income and 2)
investment banking and venture capital income. They find that both components are approximately equally related
to systemic risk. They also find that banks with higher trading income one-year prior to the recession earned lower
returns during the recession period and that no such significant effect was found for the investment banking and
venture capital income variable.
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is currently showing weak signs of mild recovery. This research is also germane to bank
regulators who examine and monitor the complex relationships between the degree of
BHC market power, cost and profit efficiency measures and overall bank stability. An
improved understanding of the connection between derivative activity and BHC charter
value expands market based discipline measures used by uninsured depositors and
investors to punish (or reward) banks for excessive (or prudent) risk taking activities.
This study contributes to the literature in the following interesting way. First, we do
not identify any published study that explicitly examines the contribution of trading
income to BHC charter value. This issue is important given the accelerated growth in
derivative activity during the first decade in the new millennium and the volatility that
trading incomes exhibit over our sample period as shown in Figure 3 while
acknowledging that the bulk of such incomes are predominately generated by dealer
banks. This study attempts to bridge the gap in the current literature on charter value and
derivative activity. Second, we examine data from 2001Q1 to 2011Q3 that covers periods
of economic expansion (including the build up of the housing bubble) and the subsequent
bust. We also cover a greater time span of the latest U.S. financial crisis. The sample time
frame covers changes in economic climate and periods of significant derivative usage that
should allow for improved inferences to be made on the effects of derivative usage on
BHC charter value. Lastly, this study contributes to the body of literature that suggests
that derivative activity is driven by profit as opposed to hedging motives. This study
implies that BHCs increase risk through their off-balance sheet activities that generate
volatile trading revenues. Any contribution of trading revenues to BHC charter value is
suspect at best due to their volatility and given the fact that they account for such a small
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fraction of BHC’s net operating revenues.
The primary finding of this study is that trading income has a negative impact on
BHC charter value yet the impact becomes positive when trading income is interacted
with derivative dealer designation. Trading income’s contribution to BHC charter value is
damped by the fact that trading income is only a small fraction of BHCs’ net operating
revenue and is highly volatile. Finally, we observe that trading income did not contribute
to overall BHC income during the financial crisis.
This study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review and
includes some discussion on bank charter value. Section 3 puts forth research
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and defines the variables used in the study.
Section 5 introduces the methodology and Section 6 discusses the results, followed by the
conclusion.
2. Literature Review
2.1 Derivative Literature
The latest derivative literature seems to be motivated by the impetus, and product innovation,
in derivative markets over the last few decades and more recently by the episodes of large
trading losses, including those generated during the latest U.S. financial crisis. These events have
heightened public investors’ interest regarding the role of banking institutions in derivative
markets (see Purnanandam (2007), Ashraf et al. (2007) Minton et al. (2009), Zhao and Moser
(2009) and Li & Yu (2010), among others). There is an ongoing debate regarding the impact of
derivative usage on bank’s risk. Purnanandam (2007) jointly model bank failure probability and
hedging decisions using a two stage estimation technique that is applied to data on U.S.
commercial banks from 1997Q4 through 2003Q3. This author’s findings are in line with hedging
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theories in that banks with higher probabilities of financial distress manage their interest rate
risks more aggressively through on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet instruments. Zhao and
Moser (2009) simultaneously model two alternative methods of interest rate risk management
(i.e. maturity gap analysis and interest rate derivative usage) on a sample of publicly traded BHC
during 1998-2003. They conclude that BHCs employ gap analysis to manage exposure to
changes in short term interest rates and use derivatives to manage residual rate exposures
resulting from changes in the slope of the term structure of interest rates. Their results support
the view that interest rate derivative usage has risk reducing effects. During the 2007-2009
financial crises, Duffie (2010) explains that dealer banks are exposed to new forms of bank runs
and describes the mechanics by which dealer banks can fail which include: (i) the flight of
prime-brokerage clients, (ii) the loss of short-term secured credit, (iii) defensive reactions of
derivatives counterparties and (iv) loss of cash and securities settlement privileges at clearing
banks.
The derivative literature has been extended in recent years to investigate credit derivatives
that according to some observers are claimed to be a revolutionary financial innovation that
allows banks to manage credit risk apart from other forms of financial risk such as interest rate
and exchange rate risks. Using annual data from 1997 through 2004 on a sample of 346 BHCs in
the U.S., Ashraf et al. (2007) find that the participation in credit derivative markets is closely
related to bank size whereas there is limited evidence that entry barriers related to franchise
value or prior experience in derivative markets are important. Examining credit derivative
activities by large U.S. bank holding companies (BHC) from 1999-2005, Minton et al. (2009)
find that only a small fraction use credit derivatives and that most of their positions are held for
dealer activities rather than for loan hedging purposes. A theoretical paper by Instefjord (2005)
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that focuses on risk and hedging through credit derivatives using a model based on costs of
financial distress proposes two effects of credit derivatives innovation. The author concludes that
credit derivatives enhance risk sharing that supports a hedging argument. However, the author
also suggests that credit derivatives make further acquisition of risk more attractive. The
implication is that if the second effect dominates the first, then credit derivative activity could
destabilize the banking sector.
Derivatives markets dealing with foreign currency claims and the expanded scope of
derivative activities into international markets have also been also been subject of research. For
example, Chaudhry et al. (2000) investigates the relationship between market based risk
measures and foreign currency claims using a three factor model on a sample of 112 U.S.
publicly traded BHC’s using data from 1989 through 1993. The results suggest that options tend
to increase bank risk, swaps are used mainly for hedging purposes, and that forward contracts
and currency commitments have only a minor impact on bank risk. The work of Chaudhry et al.
(2000) was extended to an international setting by Reichert and Shyu (2003). These authors
using multifactor index models and applying VaR analysis on bank equity find similar results to
those reported by of Chaudhry et al. (2000). The results in Reichert and Shyu (2003) are the
strongest and most consistent for the sample of U.S. dealer banks. Weaker results were obtained
for the European banks and the Japanese banks, respectively.
In sum, the relevant literature deals mostly with how derivative usage impacts bank risk and
examines the underlying motives for derivative activity- i.e. end users (mainly for hedging
purposes) vs. dealers (profit driven market making). The research does not offer clear answers as
to which of these two underlying motives is most likely to prevail. Furthermore, little attention
has been given to the effects of derivative usage on bank revenue and or on bank performance.
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We find one example in Li & Yu (2010). These authors examine the impact of derivative usage
on bank performance, proxied by return on assets (ROA), and on BHC risk, captured through the
asset volatility. Applying panel data techniques to a sample of 18 large U.S. BHC between
2005Q2 and 2008Q3, these authors find that derivative activities increased BHC overall risk
level since BHCs were able to take on more speculative positions in derivative contracts. These
authors also find that speculative derivative positions were eventually rolled down after the subprime mortgage loan crisis.
2.2 Bank Charter Value
Charter value has commonly been defined in terms of a bank’s future economic profits,
generated as a going concern, that are discounted at a market required rate of return. Banks, for
example, are able to earn economic profits by attracting funds at below-market rates (e.g. FDIC
insured demand deposits) or setting loan yields at above market rates. Under these conditions
that suggest a form of pricing power, bank’s assets (liabilities) may be valued at above (below)
their respective book values. Historically, U.S. banks derived charter value from market power
awarded to them through government regulations that curbed interbank and nonbank firm
competition i.e. geographic and product based sources of market power. The literature has put
forth other banking activities outside of traditional lending and deposit taking functions that
potentially impact charter value. One such potential source comes from off-balance sheet
activities, which is the subject of our study. Finally the literature suggests that improved bank
operational efficiencies and changes in business cycle conditions may also influence bank charter
value - see Furlong and Kwan (2006).
Jones et al. (2011) explains that although charter value may not be directly observed, theory
suggest that Tobin’s Q should be a useful proxy. These authors also formulate the relationship
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between Tobin’s Q and charter value in the following fashion. For publicly traded banks, Tobin’s
Q is defined as the market value of the bank’s assets (i.e. market value of bank equity plus its
debt) divided by the replacement cost of the bank’s assets. Therefore, Tobin’s Q may be
expresses as:
(1)
Where MVE is the market value of equity, BVL is the book value of liabilities and BVA is the
book value of assets. It is noted that if all assets and liabilities were recorded at their historical
cost and if the markets consistently valued banks correctly, then the relationship between market
value of equity, book value of equity and charter value could be expresses as:
where CV represents the bank’s charter value.

(2)

The market value of equity MVE by definition is the present value of the banks expected income
stream discounted by the risk-adjusted rate of return required by the market rm. The expected
income stream for Bank i can be separated into two components: expected normal profits NP and
expected economic profits EP. On this basis, the market value of bank equity may be written as:
(3)
In a perfectly competitive economy, all profits are competed away so that the existing
shareholders earn just the required market rate of return on their capital that they supply to the
bank. On this basis, Jones et al. (2011) suggests that the discounted stream of normal profits NP,
which are those earned in a perfectly competitive economy, will equal the book value of equity
since the market values of perfectly competitive financial assets and liabilities will equal their
respective book values. In the case where a bank can earn above-normal profits (i.e. expected
economic profits) on its capital, the present value of the future stream of cash flows will accrue
to the benefit of the stockholders. Under this condition, assets and or (liabilities) are valued by
11

the market above (below) their respective book values and the stream of economic profits
discounted at the required market rate of return will equal the bank’s charter value. By
substituting equation 2 into equation 1 we come up with the following equation:
(4)
Equation 4 shows us the relationship between Tobin’s Q and charter value. We note that Tobin’s
Q is a scaled measure of charter value. As pointed out by Jones et al. (2011), the Tobin’s Q
measure can be a misleading measure of charter value if the market fails to properly value the
bank. For example, market misalignments with respect to fundamental values usually occur
during periods of stock market bubbles or stock market crashes. If the market fails to sufficiently
discount assets for risk (in part due to the opaque nature of banks), then Tobin’s Q increases
while the high-risk assets earn substantial profits. However, Tobin’s Q falls sharply once the risk
becomes apparent and the market valuation of assets decline accordingly.
3. Research Hypotheses
This paper introduces two testable hypotheses dealing with the impact of trading incomes on
bank charter value. Furlong and Kwan (2006) find that, with the exception of the very largest
BHC, the market is less confident about the reliance on activities generating non-interest income,
including derivatives trading, relative to other banking activities. Furthermore, while trading
incomes on balance have been positive over our sample period 2001Q1-2011Q3, they represent
only a modest fraction of net operating incomes, are highly volatile and did not contribute to
overall BHC income during the crisis. According to Stiroh (2004), high volatility in trading
incomes led banks to undertake higher risk that resulted in lower risk-adjusted profits. We also
accept from Jones et al. (2011) that there is an implied negative relationship between risk and
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charter value. On this basis, trading incomes would not appear to be a contributing factor to bank
charter value. This rationalization leads to the first hypothesis:
H1: There is an inverse relationship between trading derivative incomes scaled by the sum of
net interest and non-interest income and bank charter value.
It is well documented that most derivative market making activity is generated by a few large
BCHs that dominate the market. Furlong and Kwan (2006) further note that the mix of activities
that generate non-interest income differs based on BHC size and that for the larger BHCs the mix
of income is weighted towards market making derivatives activities. The concentration in
derivative activity among few large BCHs has been explained by the requirements of substantial
investment in financial, human and intellectual capital that along with advance internal controls
and favorable trading reputation are necessary to deal in derivative markets. Furthermore, since it
is plausible that charter value is related to industry concentration and that industry concentration
is greater for dealer banks compared to smaller commercial banks in general, we would expect
that trading by dealer banks may have a positive impact on bank charter value. To the extent that
trading incomes are associated with trading exposures taken by BHC that are providing dealer
(marking-making) services to customers, trading exposures do not add to BHC risk. On the other
hand, proprietary trading by BHC would introduce an element of risk. The large dealer banks
that engage in proprietary trading typically have access to a broader scope of funding sources
and usually exhibit favorable capitalization characteristics, compared to their medium and small
counterparts that allow the large dealer banks to afford higher risk. We suggest that the largest
dealer banks can benefit from trading activity. This leads to the second hypothesis:
H2: There is a direct relationship between trading derivative incomes by dealer banks scaled
by the sum of net interest and non-interest income and bank charter value.
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4. Data
4.1 Sample and Sources
To develop our sample in the first stage we search the list of the top 50 bank
holding companies (BHC) as of 2011Q3 as reported by the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC). Privately held BHCs are excluded from the final sample
since our analysis includes a Tobin’s Q measure that uses stock price data. We also
exclude from our sample those companies that have marginal, if any, focus on traditional
banking activities (i.e. insurance companies, credit card companies, pure investment
banks).To be included in the final sample, we require that the companies have some level
of derivative activity. Applying the above sample selection criteria we identify 18 BHCs
for our study. In an effort to expand the sample size, in the final stage we relax our
selection criteria only to the extent that BHCs are no longer required to be included in the
list of the top 50 BHC which allows to consider smaller BHCs in terms of asset size and
derivative exposure which brings us to our final sample of 27 BHCs. We collect balance
sheet, income statement and derivative data for 27 bank holding companies (BHC) over
the sample time period 2001Q1 to 2011Q33. Given the focus of this study and the high
concentration of derivative usage by a small group of large BHCs as confirmed by our
Herfindahl index measure that is graphed in Figure 1, we believe that we have an
adequate representative sample that includes a good mix of BHC based on asset size,
structure, business activities and business scope4. A visual inspection of Figure 2 that

3

Although data is available prior to 2001Q1 which would expand the time horizon of this study, we believe that the
time frame we chose is adequate since it covers periods of economic expansion (including the buildup of the
housing bubble), the subsequent bust and a full time span of the latest U.S financial crisis. The time span in this
study covers interesting trends in derivative market industry concentration that over the entire time period remains
high (see Figure 1).
4
The sample includes 3 of the top 5 derivatives users that collectively account for 96% of the total banking industry
notional value of derivatives per the 2011Q3 OCCs bank trading and derivatives activity report. Roughly half of the
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presents an overlay of our sample that covers the period from 2001Q1 to 2011Q3 against
the entire population of financial institutions that engaged in derivative activity between
1998Q4 to 2012Q4 also seems to support our sample selection. We reach a similar
conclusion regarding the representative nature of our sample when we inspect Figure 3
that depicts the trading revenues (scaled by the sum of non-interest income and net
interest income) for the banks in our sample, and Figure 4 that depicts those (unscaled)
for insured U.S. commercial banks, with the latter covering a longer time span from
1997Q1 to 2012Q45. Appendix A contains the list of BHCs used in this study and the
respective total assets and total notional value of derivatives for each BHC as of the end
of sample period. The bank holding company information is extracted from Consolidated
Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (call report form FR Y-9C) that are
submitted on a quarterly basis to the Federal Reserve. The data from call reports that
BHCs file are available through the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago data base at the
following website https://www.chicagofed.org/applications/bhc_data/bhcdata_index.cfm
last accessed on 9/20/12. The BHC balance information used in this study includes total
assets, total loans, real estate loans, total liabilities, various deposit measures (e.g. interest
bearing and non-interest bearing deposits, money market savings accounts and small time
deposits < $100,000) and a Tier 1 risk based capital ratio. The BHC income statement
information consists of net interest income, non-interest income, total non interest
expense, and trading revenue. The derivative information measures the gross notional
value of derivatives broken down by contract type (i.e. interest rates, foreign exchange,
BHCs in the sample are identified on the list of the top 25 BHCs engaged in derivative activities per the previously
referenced derivatives activity OCC report.
5
Following the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, in Figure 3 the trading revenue series (which are scaled by
the sum of net interest income and non-interest income) represent an asset weighted mean to control for the wide
dispersion that exists at the right tail of the bank-size distribution. We thank the reviewer for this suggestion.
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commodities and equities) and by purpose (i.e. derivatives held for trading vs. nontrading). Appendix B contains a list of the BHC variables used in this study and their
respective code names as identified in the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago data base.
4.2 Descriptives
Table 1 panels A through C provides summary descriptive information on BHC
variables for the full sample and subsamples of BHCs based on derivatives dealer
designation. Following Sinkey and Carter (2000), we classify those BHCs that are
members of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) as dealers.
These authors assert that dealer banks are not only involved as end users of derivatives
but are also heavily active as dealers of over-the-counter (OTC) derivative products6.
Panel A suggests that we have a good mix of BHCs in our sample in terms of asset
size, albeit with some skewness, with a mean (median) of U.S. $260.6 billion (U.S.
$64.7 billion) ranging in size from a low of U.S $6.2 billion to a high of U.S. $2.370
trillion over the entire sample period. Trading derivatives, scaled by assets, seem to play
a larger role in BHC activities compared to non-traded derivatives as the mean of scaled
trading derivatives is roughly sixteen times larger than the mean of scaled non-traded
derivatives. However, it is noted that trading derivatives exhibits greater volatility
contrasted with the non-traded derivatives as seen in the large differences in standard
deviations between these two asset classes (i.e. 875.94% versus 27.15%). Trading
derivative income is also volatile, based on reported standard deviation of 6.07%, and
represents only a modest fraction of BHC net operating revenues over the sample period
as seen by the mean and (median) values of 3.09% (1.32%) respectively. On an operating
6

The sample includes 8 derivative dealers that are identified through the ISDA. They are: JP Morgan Chase & Co,
Bank of America Corporation, Citigroup, Wellsfargo & Co., State Street Corporation, Regions Financial Corp, PNC
Financial Services Group Inc and Key Corp.
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basis, the BHC in the sample appear profitable, on average, over the sample period as
measured by the mean (median) net-interest income values scaled by total average assets
of 1.90% (1.75%) respectively. Real estate portfolios and core deposits are important
components of BHC balance sheets with reported mean values, scaled by total assets,
similar to those documented in related empirical studies that examine bank charter value
(e.g. Jones et al., 2011; Furlong and Kwan, 2006).
The stark contrast between derivative dealers and non-dealers on several
characteristics is reflected in Panels B and C of Table 1. Even though there are marked
differences in terms of asset size between both groups, they exhibit similar attributes in
terms of net interest income and overall operating efficiency. While trading derivatives
and the related derivative incomes are greater for the derivative dealers compared to their
counterparts, the variability on both measures is smaller for the derivative dealers given
the respective coefficients of variation of 1.28 and 1.69 versus 1.94 and 2.08 respectively.
Dealer banks have reduced reliance on core deposits for funding purposes, greater
exposure on non-traded derivatives and smaller real estate loan exposures compared to
non-dealer banks.
Table 2 reflects summary data on the quarterly growth rate of assets, trading income
and derivatives for the full sample (Panel A) and the two bank groups (Panel BDerivative Dealer and Panel C- Non Dealers). To control for firm dynamics, particularly
resulting from mergers and acquisitions, we exclude bank-quarter data with asset growth
over the preceding quarter in excess of 50%. Due to the potential impact that mergers and
acquisitions may have on derivative activities, we also adjust trading income and trading
derivative bank-quarter data accordingly. Over the sample period 2001Q1 to 2011Q3,
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asset growth was slightly higher on average for the dealer banks compared to the nondealer banks while the former also exhibited greater growth and lower volatility from
trading incomes compared to the non-dealer banks. Table 2 also shows that while nondealer banks had higher growth in trading derivatives compared to the dealer banks they
also experienced greater variability. As of the end of sample period 2011Q3, both bank
groups, in spite of there vast size difference, exhibited strong capitalization slightly in
favor of the dealer banks (average Tier 1 capital ratio of 13.206 vs. 12.919).
Table 3 shows contemporaneous bivariate correlations for the independent variables
included in the model. With the exception of the correlations between trading derivatives
and dealer designation with BHC total assets, all other correlations are either small or
modest. The significant correlation between trading derivatives and dealer designation
with BHC total assets is not surprising since dealers hold the largest trading derivative
portfolios and are typically the largest banks. The small to modest correlations reported in
Table 3 help mitigate any potential collinearity issues that could impact the model.
5. Methodology
Given the cross-sectional and time series dimensions of the bank sample data, we
employ a panel data fixed-effects estimator to examine the effect of trading income and
dealer designation on bank charter value proxied by Tobin’s Q. The advantage of the
fixed-effects estimation is that it allows for the cross-sectional units’ (individual banks)
time invariant unobserved effects to be correlated with the explanatory variables. While
we are dealing with a relatively small bank sample, we believe that there are sufficient
differences between the banks in terms of size and scope that would prevent us from
proposing a pooled-cross section regression specification. The model includes trading
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income7 as the primary variable of interest along with various bank control variables
commonly used in the charter value literature (cf. Keeley, 1990; De Nicolo, 2001; Jones
et al., 2011; Furlong and Kwan, 2006).
The BHC total asset variable controls for the effect of size on Tobin’s Q and to
control for the potential that the relative option value of the federal deposit insurance
safety net increases with bank size as suggested by Furlong and Kwan (2006). In general,
higher charter values are associated with BHCs that exhibit higher capital ratios under the
so-called charter value hypothesis however larger BHCs tend to have lower capital ratios
compared to smaller BHCs. As charter value begins to decline, the incentive increases for
a BHC to take on added risk and abuse the deposit insurance option. On this basis, we
expect a negative relationship between assets and charter value.
The net interest income and core deposits variables are well known proxies of market
power that are widely used in bank charter value modeling. On this basis, we would
expect that the market power derived from the aforementioned operating measures (i.e.
net interest income and core deposits) is directly related to Tobin’s Q. The inclusion of a
loan variable is common in the bank charter value literature given that banks expect to
earn rents from their lending activities and thus we expect a positive relationship between
our loan variable and Tobin’s Q. In most cases, real estate loans tend to account for the
bulk of bank’s total lending portfolio, which explains why we choose this lending
variable in our specifications. Support for the efficiency variable is found in empirical

7

Trading income captures the net gain or loss from trading cash instruments, off-balance sheet derivative contracts
and sales of assets and other financial instruments. This line item also includes revaluations to carrying values of
trading assets and liabilities resulting from marking to market adjustments as well as revaluations related to marking
to market adjustments of interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, and commodity derivative contracts held for trading
purposes. Li and Yu (2010) explain that the income from derivatives trading accounts for a large portion of BHC’s
trading income.
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studies by Berger (2003), Furlong and Kwan (2006) and Turk-Ariss (2010). Efficiency
can be viewed as a potential source of bank charter value in light of emerging
technologies in processing information and managing risk. Berger (2003) explains that
given the information based nature of the banking industry, banks are responsive to
technology investments that permit them to reduce costs of back room operations and to
facilitate innovations in financial products and delivery systems. Since an increase in our
efficiency variable by construction suggests a higher degree of inefficiency, we expect a
negative relationship between efficiency and Tobin’s Q. We include non-traded and
trading derivatives in the model since these instruments are used for hedging purposes
(balance sheet risk management), trading purposes (profit motive) or some combination
thereof. To the extent that derivatives reduce balance risk and represent a monopoly
source of income we would expect that derivatives would exert a positive impact on
charter value as proxied by Tobin’s Q. The notional value of market related derivatives
may proxy as a continuing stream of future cash flows that a BHC might earn from
related fees.
Previous studies have also found that macro-economic conditions influence bank
charter value (cf. Keeley, 1990; Furlong and Kwan, 2006; Jones et al., 2011). Common to
all BHCs, the macro-economic indicators included in this study are the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) percentage gap, the S&P 500 inflation adjusted returns on the index and
the 3-month U.S. Treasury bill rate. The GDP variable controls for the state of the
business cycle while the S&P 500 inflation adjusted index returns controls for changes in
the condition of capital markets. Beforehand, we expect positive relationships between
our GDP variable and the S&P variable with Tobin’s Q since it is well documented that
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business cycle conditions and overall stock market conditions seem to be directly
correlated with Tobin’s Q. The interest rate variable controls for the changes in rate
environments that impact BHC net asset spreads. Since a rise in interest rates generally
leads to a greater decline in the market value of BHC assets over liabilities, when asset
duration is greater, we expect a negative relationship between the interest rate variable
and Tobin’s Q.
To investigate the effect of trading income and dealer designation on bank charter
value proxied by Tobin’s Q we present the following empirical model:

(5)

where Tobin’s Q is computed as the quarterly ratio of the sum of the market value of
equity plus the book value of total liabilities to BHC total assets; with bk consisting of a
vector of bank variables that include the log of BHC total assets along with net interest
income, trading and non-trading derivatives, real estate loans and core deposits all scaled
by BHC total assets and an efficiency variable measured as the ratio of BHC overhead to
the sum of net interest and non-interest income; trading derivative income scaled by the
sum of net interest and non-interest income8 which is our primary variable of interest,
and macro which is a vector of macro variables that include GDP percentage gap, S&P
500 inflation adjusted index returns and the 3-month U.S. Treasury bill rate. To avoid
spurious regression results, the GDP gap, U.S.Treasury bill rate, real estate loans and core

8

While acknowledging that non-interest income can be decomposed into two components: 1) trading income and 2)
investment banking and venture capital income as employed by Brunnermeier et al. (2012), given the emphasis of
derivative activity in our study we choose to focus on trading income in our model of BHC charter value proxied by
Tobin’s Q noting that non-interest income is used in our model to scale the efficiency and trading income variables.
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deposits variables enter the model in first difference9.
With this specification, we can test both research hypotheses. Specifically, if β2 is
significantly negative, it supports Hypothesis 1 that there is an inverse relationship
between trading derivative incomes and bank charter value. On the other hand, if β2 is
significantly positive when interacted with the dealer indicator variable, it supports
Hypothesis 2 that there is a direct relationship between trading derivative incomes by
dealer banks sand bank charter value.
The model bears resemblance to the specification used by Jones et al. (2011) and Li
and Yu (2010) with some unique differences. First, we introduce the trading income
variable, our main variable of interest, that is absent in the specification by Jones et al.
(2011). Although the trading income is controlled for in Li and Yu (2010), they focus on
examining the impact of derivatives on bank performance, in terms of return on assets
(ROA), and volatility in asset values using stock price volatility and option pricing
modeling. Second, we control for derivatives dealer designation to explore behavior
differences within our sample and the effects on charter value, proxied by Tobin’s Q.
Third, we incorporate trading and non-trading derivatives in our model which are omitted
from Jones et al. (2011) specification while Li and Yu’s (2010) control for only nontraded derivatives in their model. By including trading and non-trading derivatives in the
model we set out to capture the full impact of derivative usage on charter value
acknowledging that there may be differences in the underlying motivation for their use
(i.e. balance sheet risk management vs. profit motives).

9

We apply the Im-Pesaran-Shin’s (2003) unit root test designed for panel data to all the model variables. The null
of the test is that all panels contain unit roots. We conclude that with the exception of the real estate loans, core
deposits, GDP gap and 3 month U.S. Treasury bill rate variables, at least one series in the panel is stationary. Unit
root test tables are not reported in this study but are available upon request.
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We expand the benchmark model to incorporate two additional specifications. First,
we introduce a financial crisis dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 during the
crisis quarter 2007Q3 through 2008Q4 and zero otherwise. During the financial crisis
Huerta et al. (2011) suggest that anxiety, fear and panic were prevalent emotions among
investors which arguably contributed to the stock market volatility. During this period
there was also heighten uncertainty with regards to the quality of bank balance sheets due
to heavy exposures fueled by aggressive subprime lending activity. A priori we would
expect that the financial crisis would have unfavorable impacts on charter value given the
imbedded risks on bank balance sheet and on off-balance vehicles that had accumulated
during the economic expansion period led by housing boom period. Therefore, we expect
a negative relationship between the crisis indicator variable and Tobin’s Q.
Second, we allow for the interaction between trading derivative incomes and dealer
designation. We wish to examine whether the impact of trading income on charter value
operates through the derivative dealer designation. A priori, if derivative dealers enjoy a
monopolistic advantage in this market, we would expect that the impact on charter value
would be favorable under the premise that trading incomes represent an important
contribution to overall BHC incomes. Under this line of reasoning we would expect a
positive relationship between trading income and Tobin’s Q when trading income is
interacted with the dealer designation indicator variable.
6. Results
6.1 Panel Data Regression Analysis
In Table 4 we report the results of our fixed effects panel estimations for the
benchmark mark (Model 1) and the two alternative specifications (Models 2 and 3). In
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Model 2 we control for the potential impact of the financial crisis on BHC charter value
through a dummy variable “crisis” (1 for the period between 2007Q3 and 2008Q4, and 0
otherwise) and in Model 3 we include an interaction term between trading income and
dealer designation. The coefficients of the trading derivatives income variable, the
primary variable of interest in this study, are negative in all models ranging from -0.162
in Model 1 to -0.542 in Model 3, yet statistically significant only in Model 3. These
results can be linked to the study by Li and Yu’s (2010) who find that trading incomes
have no impact on BHC ROA while having a significant and positive correlation with the
volatility of asset values. Trading’s income impact on asset volatility and its null impact
on ROA would suggest a negative impact, if any, on BHC charter value. Neither trading
derivatives nor non-trading derivatives holdings have a statistically significant impact on
BHC charter value. This result suggest that the risk reducing attributes of derivative
activity may be subdued by un-hedged BHC risk attributes and other balance sheet
uncertainties at minimum with regards to our sample and sample time frame.
Furthermore, to the extent that trading derivatives are assets that belong to customers,
there would be no risk taken by the BHC under this premise which would imply a nonimpact on charter value.
The positive and significant impact of net interest income on BHC charter value in all
three models is consistent with empirical findings in the BHC charter literature. The
coefficients range from 0.362 in Model 3 to 0.374 in Model 2, and are significant at the
5% level, suggesting that this source of operational market power leads to improved BHC
charter value. The results support the view that BHCs retain a form pricing power that
allows them to set loan yields at above market rates will attracting funds, mainly insured
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demand deposits, at below-market rates. The coefficients on the core-deposit variable are
negative and modestly significant at the 10% level in all three models ranging from 0.182 in Model 3 to -0.198 in Model 2. This result is inconsistent with theory yet it is not
surprising given the trend that we observe in the Tobin’s Q and core-deposit series
graphed in Figures 5 and 6 respectively. There has been a general downward trend in
Tobin’s Q over the sample period while bank core-deposits, a common measure of
market power, have been on the rise. Jones et al. (2011) conclude that BHC charter value,
proxied by Tobin’s Q, has been on the decline given the increase risk-taking by banks
that led to the subprime financial crisis. Cornett et al. (2011) suggest that during the
financial crisis period funds were leaving the securities market and flowing into the
banking system with most of these funds going into transaction deposits. While a rise in
core deposits implies an increase in market power that ceteris paribus should translate to
an improved charter value, the Tobin’s Q and Core Deposit series depicted in Figures 5
and 6 suggest that there may be other forces that are unrelated to market power that are
driving the results.
While the BHC total assets, efficiency and real estate variables are of the expected
sign, only the BHC total asset variable are statistically significant in all three
specifications ranging from -0.127 in Model 1 to -0.124 in Models 2 and 3. The negative
and significant coefficient on the BHC total asset variable supports the view that there are
diseconomies of scale such as those related to technology investments that the larger
banks are commonly exposed. Alternatively the negative coefficients may also signal
restrictions regarding the potential for continued potential growth that constrain the larger
banks.
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The coefficients on the GDP and interest rate variables are of the expected sign yet
only significant in the case of the GDP variable ranging from 1.498 in Model 3 to 1.617
in Model 1. The positive and significant effect of the GDP variable suggests that the
business cycles influence BHC charter value. It is common for BHC to enjoy higher
profits during business cycle booms that are accompanied by an economic environment
that exhibits strong loan demand and high credit quality. Conversely, BHC charter values
would be expected to diminish if BHCs record falling profits during periods of economic
contraction. Interestingly, the coefficients on the S&P 500 variable are negative yet
statistically insignificant in all 3 models ranging from -0.020 in Model 1 to -0.026 in
Model 2. This result, while not statistically significant, is at odds with the findings by
Jones et al. (2011) who claim that Tobin’s Q measures of charter value are heavily
influenced by price-earnings ratios and overall stock market performance. These authors
contend that if markets fail to adequately discount assets to account for their imbedded
risk, Tobin’s Q would remain high during periods when the high-risk assets are
generating strong profits. Eventually Tobin’s Q would be adjusted downward once the
risk become apparent and the market value of the assets adjust accordingly. The small
negative, coefficients on the S&P variable are not entirely surprising given the trend that
we observe in the Tobin’s Q and S&P 500 series graphed in Figures 5 and 7 respectively.
While Tobin’s Q series reflects downward trends given the events (and resulting
outcomes) that negatively impacted the banking industry (i.e. balance uncertainty,
excessive risk taking, subprime lending, losses and increasing leverage, among others),
the returns on the S&P 500 index, that captures multiple industries, reflects a volatile yet
fairly flat trend over the sample period.
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To the extent that the financial crisis had any impact on BHC charter value we would
presume that its effect would be negative. During the financial crisis period BHCs were
highly concerned about balance sheet valuations (as well as those of their competitors).
Furthermore, they were exposed to significant liquidity constraints and overall financial
market disruption. The coefficients on the financial crisis dummy variable are negative
yet not significant. The positive and significant coefficient in the interaction term
between trading income and dealer designation included in Model 3 is an interesting
result. The implication is that dealer banks (as opposed to non-dealer banks) are well
equipped to adequately manage risk and are able to benefit from profitable trading
activities that favorably impact BHC charter value.
6.2 Quartile Ranking Analysis
Some researchers including Jones et al. (2011) suggest that the cardinal properties of
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for charter value are inadequate since Tobin’s Q values are largely
influenced by external factors such as price earnings ratios and overall stock market
conditions that are not necessarily connected to market power. Furthermore, while charter
value is typically viewed as a long-term slow-moving financial investment concept that is
based on a firm’s ability to generate ongoing economic profits, Tobin’s Q values reflect
large swings in unison with changes in the business cycle. Based on this line of
reasoning, Tobin’s Q is arguably a poor cardinal measure of charter value (i.e. Tobin’s Q
is unable to adequately measure the amount of change in the magnitude of charter
value).To mitigate this issue, we reexamine our research questions relying on the ordinal
properties of Tobin’s Q in a similar fashion that was employed by Jones et al. (2011).
Under the view that Tobin’s Q has adequate ordinal properties, at any given point in
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time those BHCs that have the higher Tobin’s Q values (compared to the BHC’s with the
lower Tobin’s Q values) may have the stronger incentive to refrain from risk-taking
under the assumption that BHC wish to preserve the economic benefits that are realizable
through the granting of the charter. Jones et al. (2011) explain that in an effort to retain
their competitive advantage, BHC take on less risk by holding more capital as their
charter value increases. Before hand, we would anticipated that BHCs with higher
charter values upon entering the crisis period should perform better compared to their
counterparts under the premise that charter preservation matters.
To conduct our analysis based on the ordinal properties of Tobin’s Q we first
categorize the Tobin’s Q values as of 2006Q4 for the BHC in the sample into quartiles
with the first quartile comprised of the BHC with the lowest Tobin’s Q value with the 4th
quartile consisting of BHC’s with the highest Tobin’s Q values. Next, we compute the
mean values for the risk variable (Tier 1 Capital Ratio) along with the mean values for
the efficiency and trading derivative variables by quartile. We also compute the mean
values of the changes in the referenced variables between 2006Q4 and 2008Q4 by
quartile. If Tobin’s Q is useful measure of BHC charter value then we should see a
negative correlation between Tobin’s Q in 2006Q4 and the level of (and changes in) risk
at 2008Q4 if preservation of charter value is relevant.
Panel A in Table 5 suggests that BHC with the highest Tobin’s Q values had the
stronger balance sheets as evidenced by the Tier 1 capital ratios as of 2008Q4 compared
to capital ratios of the BHCs that reported the lowest levels of Tobin’s Q. The difference
in the Tier 1 capital ratios between these two groups however is statistically insignificant
(p-value of 0.910). While the BHCs with the highest Tobin’s Q value at 2006Q4 also
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reported better efficiency measures in 2008Q4 compared to the BHC’s in the lowest
quartile (0.672 vs.0.790 ), the difference between the groups was not statistically
significant. BHC’s with the highest Tobin’s Q values at 2006Q4, reflected lower levels of
trading derivative positions as of 2008Q4, which would imply some form of risk
aversion, yet this group of BHCs outperformed their peers that are ranked with the lowest
Tobin’s Q values in terms of trading incomes. Similar conclusions are reached in
examining Panel B of Table 5 in terms of changes in the variable values between 2006Q4
and 2008Q4 yet again the group differences were statistically insignificant. Some
interesting, albeit not statistically significant, observations in Panel B of Table 5 is that
the BHC’s with the lowest Tobin’s Q values reduced their exposures to trading
derivatives while the highest Tobin’s Q group of BHCs reported a small increase in
trading derivatives yet with virtually no change in trading derivative incomes between
2006Q4 and 2008Q4.
During the height of the financial crisis period 2007Q3 to 2008Q4, all but four BHCs
(i.e. State Street Corporation, Wells Fargo & Co, Key Corporation and Regions
Financial Corporation), reported cumulative trading losses. The pre-crisis charter value,
proxied by Tobin’s Q as of 2006Q4 for these four BHC’s reflected no discernible pattern.
State Street and Wells Fargo are ranked in the highest Tobin’s Q quartile while Key
Corporation and Regions Financial Corporation are ranked in the second lowest and the
lowest quartiles respectively. The largest trading losses were reported by derivative
dealer BHCs Citigroup and Bank of America Corporation whose Tobin’s Q ranked in the
lower quartiles (i.e. weaker BHC charter values). While there are large differences in
asset size and core deposit holdings between dealer and non dealer BHCs, dealer BHC
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witness growth in quarterly trading revenues during the sample period while non-dealer
BHCs reported a contraction in quarterly trading income activity.
We conduct robustness checks that are presented in Models 1 through 3 in Table 6.
As an initial attempt to capture the potential dynamic interactions between bank charter
value (proxied by Tobin’s Q) and its determinants (the right hand side variables in our
model) as well as the persistence in the Tobin’s Q series, we allow for a lag value of
Tobin’s Q to enter our fixed effects specification in Model 1. The findings are generally
consistent with our expectations in that trading derivative incomes do not favorably
impact bank charter value based on the statistically insignificant coefficient of -0.017 in
Model 1. On the other hand we do not find evidence of a positive relationship between
trading derivative incomes by dealer banks and bank charter value. We reach similar
conclusions in Model 2 in which we replace the current trading derivative income with a
lag of itself.
In Model 3 we explore an alternative proxy of bank charter value that is defined as
the ratio of core deposits to BHC total deposits, a proxy that was introduced by Jones et
al. (2011). Interestingly, we find that trading derivative incomes have a positive impact
on bank charter value based on the statistically significant coefficient of 0.885 while the
interaction between trading derivative incomes and dealer banks has a negative impact
based on the statistically significant coefficient of -0.985 reported in Model 3. The
findings in Model 3 that at first glance seem to be at odds with our hypotheses are not
necessarily surprising. A visual inspection of Figures 3 and 4 which depict the Tobin’s Q
and the core deposit series respectively show two opposing patterns. For a greater part of
the time span covered, Tobin’s Q has been in a general downward trend in part due to the
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increase risk-taking activities by banks that led to the financial crisis while since the latter
part of 2007 bank core deposit have sharply increased. The banks received a significant
influx of liquidity through Federal Reserve Bank expansion activity (multiple rounds of
quantitative easing) and as a result of a massive restructure of the financial sector balance
sheets. The inconsistency in the findings based on the use of different proxies of bank
charter value (i.e. Tobin’s Q vs. core deposits) lends support to the general conclusion by
Jones et al. (2011) regarding the reliability of Tobin’s Q as key measure of charter value.

7. Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between derivative trading income and charter
value for 27 bank holding companies (BHC) between 2001Q1 and 2011Q3. This paper is
motivated by the continued evolution in derivative securities, and the significant trading
losses recorded during the 2007-2009 financial crises, that have drawn attention to bank
regulators, law makers and the investor public. There are some researchers who contend
that off-balance-activities, including derivatives trading, have become a potential source
of bank charter value for the large banks. To the extent that derivatives reduce balance
risk (used for hedging purposes) and represent a monopoly source of income (used for
trading/profit purposes) we would expect that derivatives would exert a positive impact
on charter value as proxied by Tobin’s Q.
The findings in this paper suggests that trading incomes have a negative impact on
BHC charter value suggesting that derivative activity is driven more by profit as opposed
to hedging motives. This finding implies that BHCs increase risk through their offbalance sheet activities that generate volatile trading revenues. We also find that while
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that trading income has a negative impact on BHC charter value, the impact becomes
positive when trading income is interacted with derivative dealer designation. This
finding implies that dealer banks (as opposed to non-dealer banks) are well equipped to
adequately manage risk and are able to benefit from profitable trading activities that
favorably impact BHC charter value. In any event, trading income’s contribution to BHC
charter value is most likely damped by the fact that trading income is only a small
fraction of BHCs’ net operating revenue and is highly volatile. On this basis, we are
inclined to believe that any contribution of trading incomes to BHC charter value may be
suspect at best. Finally, we observe that trading income did not contribute to overall
BHC income during the financial crisis.
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Figure 1 Derivative Contracts Market-Herfindahl index

Quarters

Notes: The Herfindahl Index is computed from the reported notional amounts of derivative contracts outstanding for
each of the top 25 commercial banks, savings and loans associations (S&Ls) and trust companies (TCs) along with
aggregate notional amounts for the remaining commercial banks, S&L’s and TC’s that engage in derivative activity.
The information is extracted from the quarterly reports of derivative activities that are available through the U.S.
Department of the Treasury’s Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) at the following website
(http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/derivatives-quarterlyreport.html) last accessed on 8/21/13.
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Figure 2 Derivative and total asset growth

Quarters
Overall Assets (Tril US $)
Sample Assets (Tril US $)

Overall Derivatives (Tril US $)
Sample Derivatives (Tril US $)

Notes: The dashed line identified as “sample derivatives” represents the sum of total trading derivatives held by the
27 bank holding companies (BHC) in our sample. The solid line identified as “sample assets” constitutes the sum of
total assets held by the 27 BHCs in the sample. Both series cover the sample period from 2001Q1to2011Q3. The
solid line identified as “overall derivatives” captures the total notional amount of derivative contracts outstanding for
each of the top 25 commercial banks, savings and loans associations (S&Ls) and trust companies (TCs) along with
aggregate notional amounts for the remaining commercial banks, S&L’s and TC’s that engage in derivative
activity. The dash dotted dash line identified as “overall assets” represents the sum of the total assets of those
commercial banks, S&L’s and TC that are engaged in derivative activity and that correspond to the institutions
included in the “overall derivative” series. The “overall assets” and “overall derivative” series cover the period from
1998Q4 to 2012Q4. The information for the “overall derivative” and “overall asset” series are extracted from the
quarterly reports of derivative activities that are available through the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) at the following website (http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capitalmarkets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/derivatives-quarterly-report.html)last accessed on 8/21/13.
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Figure 3 Trading revenues scaled by net interest and non interest income
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Notes: These series represent asset weighted mean trading revenues scaled by the sum of net interest income and
non-interest income for the 27 bank holding companies (BHC) in the sample. The series cover the full sample
period from 2001Q1 to 2011Q3.
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Figure 4 Trading revenues of U.S. Commercial Banks

Quarters

Notes: These series represent quarterly trading revenues from cash and derivative activities by insured U.S.
commercial banks. Revenue figures are quarterly data as opposed to cumulative data. The information is extracted
from the quarterly reports of derivative activities that are available through the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) at the following website (http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capitalmarkets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/derivatives-quarterly-report.html)last accessed on 8/21/13.
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Figure 5 Tobin’s Q Trend

Quarters

Notes: The series represents the mean Tobin’s Q for the 27 bank holding companies (BHC) in the sample. The
Tobin’s Q measure is calculated on a quarterly basis and consists of the ratio of the sum of the market value of
equity plus the book value of total BHC liabilities divided by BHC total assets. The quarterly market value of
equity is derived from the monthly market capitalization data for each of the BHCs that are available through the
Bloomberg data base (http://bloomberg.com). The BHCs total liabilities and assets information is extracted from
quarterly call reports that are available through the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago data base at the following
website: https://www.chicagofed.org/applications/bhc_data/bhcdata_index.cfm. The series cover the full sample
period from 2001Q1to 2011Q3.
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Figure 6 Core Deposit Trend

Quarters

Notes: The series represents the mean core deposits scaled by BHC total liabilities for the 27 bank holding
companies (BHC) in the sample. Core deposits include the sum of non-interest bearing and interest bearing demand
deposits, money market and savings accounts plus time deposits < U.S. $100,000. The series cover the full sample
period from 2001Q1to 2011Q3.
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Figure 7 S&P 500 index returns

Quarters

Notes: The series represents the Standard & Poors (S&P) 500 inflation-adjusted returns on the index.
The S&P 500 index returns series is derived from data that is available through Thomson Reuter’s Datastream.
The series cover the full sample period from 2001Q1to 2011Q3.
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Table 1. BHC Descriptive Statistics
Net Interest
Incomestandardized by
avg assets

Trading
Derivativesstandardized by
total assets

Trading Derivative
Income
standardized by
net operating
revenue

Real Estate
Loans
standardized by
total assets

260,639,045

1.90%

326.44%

3.09%

64,733,769

1.75%

19.38%

1.32%

508,518,644

1.02%

875.94%

Min

6,239,843

0.21%

Max

2,370,594,235

Total Assets

Efficiency

Core Deposits
standardized
by total
liabilities

Non Traded
Derivativesstandardized by
total assets

34.84%

63.10%

54.94%

20.85%

34.18%

61.01%

61.03%

12.73%

6.07%

14.84%

19.41%

21.20%

27.15%

0.00%

-49.73%

0.00%

39.44%

0.86%

0.00%

6.30%

5704.55%

40.52%

63.56%

517.91%

91.20%

242.93%

1064.53%

4.47%

24.50%

64.44%

41.14%

32.25%

Full sample- Panel A
mean
median
Std. Dev.

Derivatives dealer- Panel B
mean

722,675,006

1.63%

median

341,754,500

1.50%

292.13%

2.91%

26.56%

61.56%

49.33%

17.89%

Std. Dev.

734,147,890

0.93%

1364.41%

7.55%

14.85%

11.89%

23.71%

37.99%

Min

66,409,507

0.21%

11.60%

-49.73%

0.00%

45.71%

0.86%

0.21%

Max

2,370,594,235

4.54%

5704.55%

25.66%

53.04%

159.74%

77.81%

242.39%

mean

58,662,393

2.01%

22.74%

2.49%

39.34%

62.51%

60.94%

15.89%

median

32,753,772

1.92%

4.71%

0.86%

40.04%

60.66%

63.18%

9.38%

Std. Dev.

Non dealer- Panel C

60,858,544

1.04%

44.20%

5.19%

12.39%

21.88%

16.80%

18.71%

Min

6,239,843

0.25%

0.00%

-10.51%

0.07%

39.44%

1.97%

0.00%

Max

330,141,000

6.30%

287.78%

40.52%

63.56%

517.91%

91.20%

132.16%

Notes: Total assets are expressed in levels and in thousands of dollars while all other bank variables are expressed in ratio form. The descriptive detail is
computed for the entire sample period from 2001Q1 to 2011Q3. The data is extracted from Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (call
report form FR-Y- 9C) that are submitted on a quarterly basis to the Federal Reserve. The data is available through the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago data
base at the following website https://www.chicagofed.org/applications/bhc_data/bhcdata_index.cfm last accessed on 9/20/12. The full sample includes 27 bank
holding companies (BHC). Dealer banks include: JP Morgan Chase & Co, Bank of America Corporation, Citigroup, Wellsfargo & Co., State Street Corporation,
Regions Financial Corp, PNC Financial Services Group Inc and Key Corp. For the full list of sample banks refer to Appendix A. Author’s calculations.
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Table 2. Sample BHC size, asset growth, capitalization, trading revenue and derivative growth

Total Assets at
2011Q3

Quarterly Asset
Growth (%)
2001Q1-2011Q3

Tier 1 risk based
capital ratio at
2011Q3

Quarterly Trading
Income growth
(%) 2001Q12011Q3

Quarterly Trading
Derivatives growth
(%) 2001Q12011Q3

mean

380,561,576

1.69%

13.004

-62.58%

1995.00%

median

92,751,923

1.29%

12.840

0.00%

0.00%

Std. Dev.

699,837,914

5.03%

1.84

2127.52%

66092.37%

Min

13,475,572

-38.39%

10.320

-69060.29%

-100.00%

Max

2,289,240,000

48.53%

17.870

6440.51%

2200000.00%

mean

1,055,932,717

1.76%

13.206

22.33%

4.58%

median

787,250,233

1.39%

12.980

-5.69%

3.03%

Std. Dev.

988,981,195

5.80%

2.068

448.65%

14.43%

Min

89,405,605

-38.39%

11.260

-1331.17%

-31.55%

Max

2,289,240,000

39.21%

17.870

6440.51%

156.83%

mean

78,174,644

1.67%

12.919

-97.63%

2803.29%

median

38,179,000

1.28%

12.560

0.00%

0.00%

Std. Dev.

84,537,353

4.68%

1.789

2510.63%

78371.42%

Min

13,475,572

-13.84%

10.320

-69060.29%

-100.00%

Max

330,141,000

48.53%

16.100

4300.00%

2200000.00%

Full sample- Panel A

Derivatives dealer- Panel B

Non dealer- Panel C

Notes: Total assets are expressed in thousands of dollars while the bank tier 1 risk capital measure is in ratio form. Quarterly assets and trading
derivatives growth rates are based on a simple computation: {(value present quarter- value prior quarter)/value prior quarter}. The quarterly
trading revenues are annualized prior to computing the quarterly growth rates.
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Table 3. Correlation matrix of independent variables, sample period 2001Q1-2011Q3

BHC Total Assets
Net Interest Income-std
Trading Deriv-std
Trading Deriv Income-std
R/E loans-std
Efficiency
GDP % GAP
S&P 500 index ret
TB3MOS
Core Deposits-std
Non Trading Deriv-std
Crisis
Dealer

Trading
Core
Non
BHC Total Net Interest Trading
Deriv R/E loansS&P 500
Efficiency GDP % GAP
TB3MOS Deposits- Trading
Assets Income-std Deriv- std Incomestd
index ret
std
Deriv-std
std
1.0000
-0.1283
1.0000
0.6670
-0.2065
1.0000
0.1423
-0.2208
0.3095
1.0000
-0.0275
0.0287
-0.0135
-0.0414
1.0000
-0.0352
-0.1094
0.0283
0.0297
0.0068
1.0000
-0.0315
-0.0170
0.0022
0.0825
0.0081 -0.1247
1.0000
0.0176
-0.0939
0.0143
0.0884 -0.0317 -0.0368
0.6688
1.0000
-0.0125
-0.0625
-0.0003
0.0803
0.0675 -0.0065
0.4829
0.3506
1.0000
0.0069
0.1098
-0.0105
-0.0030
0.1538
0.0979
-0.1493 -0.0610
0.0048
1.0000
0.3428
0.1003
0.0200
0.1085
0.0402 -0.0190
0.0247 -0.0111
0.0089
-0.0218
1.0000
0.0592
0.0553
0.0145
-0.1721 -0.0327 -0.0015
-0.4399 -0.3731 -0.5272
-0.0201
-0.0316
0.7086
-0.1714
0.5384
0.1417 -0.0268
0.0439
-0.0012
0.0022
0.0000
-0.0217
0.2847

Crisis

1.0000
0.0043

Dealer

1.0000

Notes: BHC total assets enter in log form. The net interest income variable is scaled by BHC average quarterly assets. Trading derivatives (Trading Deriv)
includes the sum of the gross notional values of interest rate, foreign exchange, equity and commodity derivatives held for trading scaled by BHC assets. Trading
derivative income (Trading Deriv Income) is scaled by the sum of net interest and non-interest income. Real estate loans (R/E loans) are scaled by BHC assets
and expressed in first difference. Efficiency is measured as the ratio of bank overhead to the sum of net interest and non-interest income. The GDP% GAP is the
percentage difference between actual and potential GDP and is expressed in first difference. The S&P500 is the inflation-adjusted returns on the Standard &
Poors 500 index. The TB3MOS is the first difference of the 3-month Treasury bill market rate. Core-Deposits are the first difference of the ratio of core deposits
to total BHC liabilities. Core deposits include the sum of non-interest bearing and interest bearing demand deposits, money market and savings accounts plus
time deposits < $100,000.Non trading derivatives (NonTrading Deriv) include the sum of the gross notional values of interest rate, foreign exchange, equity and
commodity derivatives held for purposes other than trading scaled by BHC assets. Dealer is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dealer banks and zero
otherwise. Crisis is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 during the crisis quarters 2007Q3 through 2008Q4 and zero otherwise.
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Table 4. Fixed effects panel models for assessing the impact of trading derivative income on
BHC charter value
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

3.398***

3.360***

3.374***

(0.319)

(0.298)

(0.302)

-0.127***

-0.124***

-0.124***

Independent variables
Constant
BHC Total Assets

(0.017)

(0.016)

(0.016)

0.366**

0.374**

0.362**

(0.142)

(0.148)

(0.147)

-0.001

-0.001

-0.001

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.162

-0.172

-0.542***

(0.103)

(0.109)

(0.134)

0.274

0.276

0.278

(0.190)

(0.192)

(0.192)

-0.057

-0.057

-0.055

(0.036)

(0.036)

(0.034)

1.617***

1.581***

1.498***

(0.277)

(0.254)

(0.250)

-0.020

-0.026

(0.019)

(0.024)

-0.023
(0.023)

TB3MO

-0.012

-0.016*

-0.017**

(0.007)

(0.008)

(0.008)

Coredep-std

-0.192*

-0.198*

-0.182*

(0.095)

(0.098)

(0.090)

0.010

0.009

0.001

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.025)

-0.007

-0.005

(0.009)

(0.008)

Net Interest Income-std
Trading Deriv -std
Trading Deriv Income-std
R/E loans-std
Efficiency
GDP % Gap
S&P 500 ret

Non-Trading Deriv -std
Crisis
Trading Deriv Income-std* Dealer
Bank Fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Time dummies

No

No

0.485***
(0.129)
Yes
No

Cross sections (BHC)

27

27

27

0.4534

0.4543

0.4694

Within R

2

Notes: The dependent variable Tobin’s Q and all other variables enter the model in quarterly frequency. Refer to
Table 3 for a detailed description of the variables employed in the model. We employ Hausman Tests to determine
whether fixed or random effects are the appropriate specification. The statistic is Chi-square distributed. The null
hypothesis of the test is that the coefficients estimated by random effects estimator are the same as the ones
estimated by the fixed effects estimator. Significant P-values support fixed effects estimation. Robust standard errors
are reported in parenthesis. The symbols *, ** and *** refer to levels of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. There are
1063 observations in each model run. Sample Period 2001Q1 -2011Q3.
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Table 5. Charter value quartile and changes in key bank variables
Panel A Variable levels at 2008Q4
Trading
Derivative
Incomestandardized

Tobin’s Q quartiles
2006Q4
Tier 1 Cap Ratio

Efficiency

Trading
Derivativesstandardized

1st- lowest

12.246

0.790

5.345

0.008

2nd

10.604

0.774

5.470

-0.082

3rd

10.921

0.608

0.306

0.012

4th-highest

12.462

0.672

1.483

0.045

Q4-Q1

0.216

-0.118

-3.861

0.037

P-values

0.910

0.461

0.489

0.425

Trading
Derivative
Incomestandardized
-0.029

Panel B Change in variable between 2006Q4 and 2008Q4

1st- lowest

Tier 1 Cap Ratio
2.186

Efficiency
0.142

Trading
Derivativesstandardized
-1.173

2nd

2.158

0.190

0.755

-0.110

3rd

0.997

0.051

-0.172

-0.002

4th-highest

2.345

0.054

0.311

0.006

Q4-Q1

0.159

-0.087

1.483

0.036

P-values

0.909

0.584

0.303

0.475

Notes: BHC have been divided into quartiles based on 2006Q4 computed Tobin’s Q values. For
each quartile the mean values of each of the four variables identified above are computed as of
2008Q4 and reported in Panel A. Mean changes in the variables between 2006Q4 and 2008Q4 are
computed and reported in Panel B. We test for the differences in means (assuming unequal group
variances) between the lowest and highest quartiles. P-values based on two tail test. The null hypothesis
is that there is no difference between the means of the two groups.
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Table 6. Robustness checks for fixed effects panel models
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Independent variables
Constant

0.424*** 3.358***
-0.147
(0.055)
(0.298)
(0.668)
Tobin’s Q (1-lag)
0.897***
(0.016)
BHC Total Assets
-0.017*** -0.125***
0.048
(0.003)
(0.016)
(0.038)
Net Interest Income-std
-0.020
0.416**
0.418**
(0.057)
(0.159)
(0.178)
Trading Deriv -std
-0.000
-0.001
0.000
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.002)
Trading Deriv Income-std
-0.017
0.885**
(0.018)
(0.367)
Trading Deriv Income-std (1-lag)
-0.152
(0.151)
R/E loans-std
-0.047
0.288
-0.107
(0.062)
(0.198)
(0.154)
Efficiency
-0.002
-0.053
0.034
(0.003)
(0.033)
(0.029)
GDP % Gap
0.330*** 1.755***
0.821**
(0.118)
(0.297)
(0.394)
S&P 500 ret
0.072***
-0.033
-0.061
(0.010)
(0.026)
(0.040)
TB3MO
-0.008** -0.019**
-0.010
(0.003)
(0.009)
(0.015)
Coredep-std
-0.055**
-0.194*
(0.024)
(0.098)
Non-Trading Deriv –std
0.003
0.011
-0.094
(0.003)
(0.029)
(0.081)
Crisis
-0.008***
-0.004
-0.051***
(0.002)
(0.008)
(0.017)
Trading Deriv Income-std* Dealer
0.003
0.050
-0.985***
(0.022)
(0.096)
(0.347)
Bank Fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Time dummies
No
No
No
Cross sections (BHC)
27
27
27
Within R2
0.9316
0.4502
0.1283
Notes: The dependent variable Tobin’s Q in Models 1and 2 is defined as the ratio of the sum of the market value of
equity plus the book value of total liabilities to bank holding company (BHC) total assets. The dependent variable in
Model 3 is the ratio of core deposits to BHC total deposits. All variables enter the model in quarterly frequency.
Refer to Table 3 for a detailed description of the independent variables employed in the models. We employ
Hausman Tests to determine whether fixed or random effects are the appropriate specification. The statistic is Chisquare distributed. The null hypothesis of the test is that the coefficients estimated by random effects estimator are
the same as the ones estimated by the fixed effects estimator. Significant P-values support fixed effects estimation.
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The symbols *, ** and *** refer to levels of significance of 10%,
5% and 1%. There are 1063 observations in each model run. Sample Period 2001Q1 -2011Q3.
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Appendix A. List of Sample Bank Holding Companies (BHC).

Bank Holding Co (BHC)
Wells Fargo & Co

Total Assets
9/30/2011
(dollar
amounts in
thousands)
1,304,945,000

Total Notional
Value of
Derivatives
9/30/11 (dollar
amounts in
thousands)
3,777,483,000

BCH ID
1120754

Ticker Symbol
WFC

US Bancorp

1119794

USB

330,141,000

111,115,000

SunTrust Banks Inc

1131787

STI

172,583,676

300,898,148

Capital One Financial Corp

2277860

COF

200,148,496

72,031,010

KeyCorp

1068025

KEY

89,405,605

68,803,519

Commerica Incorporated

1199844

CMA

60,991,256

17,920,010

First Horizon National Corporation

1094640

FHN

Citigroup

1951350

JP Morgan Chase & Co

1039502

Associated Banc-Corp

1199563

BB& T Corporation

1074156

BOK Financial Corporation

1883693

Commerce Bancshares Inc

25,572,194

21,950,513

C

1,935,992,000

51,712,103,000

JPM

2,289,240,000

69,996,484,000

ASBC

21,902,649

4,304,552

BBT

167,676,889

67,415,207

BOKF

24,989,313

32,493,783

1049341

CBSH

20,651,278

644,172

City National Corporation

1027518

CYN

23,104,260

1,859,887

Bank of America Corporation

1073757

BAC

2,221,386,576

69,785,686,360

First BanCorp

2744894

FBP

13,475,572

292,871

First Citizens BancShares Inc

1075612

FCNCA

21,015,345

265,933

Fifth Third Bancorp

1070345

FITB

114,904,741

74,345,825

Huntington Bancshares Inc

1068191

HBAN

54,978,707

24,011,292

Northern Trust Co

1199611

NTRS

96,098,241

264,816,885

PNC Financial Services Group Inc

1069778

PNC

269,555,466

372,015,262

Regions Financial Corp

3242838

RF

129,761,507

157,966,651

Synovus Financial Corporation

1078846

SNV

28,253,924

2,055,552

State Street Corporation

1111435

STT

207,175,585

1,469,172,135

Zions Bancorporation

1027004

ZION

51,531,600

6,641,391

TCF Financial Corporation

2389941

TCB

19,120,101

176,541

Popular Inc

1129382

BPOP

38,179,000

1,753,000
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Appendix B. BHC Variables and Code Names
Schedule

Variable name

Code

HI- Consolidated Income statement

Net interest income

BHCK 4074

""

""

""

Total noninterest income

BHCK 4079

""

""

""

Total noninterest expense (bank overhead)

BHCK 4093

Trading Revenue

BHCK A220

HC- Consolidated Balance Sheet

Total assets

BHCK 2170

""

Total liabilities

BHCK 2948

HC- C- Loans & Leases Financing Receivables

Loans secured by real estate

BHCK 1410

""

Total loans

BHCK 2122

Interest bearing demand deposits

BHCB 3187

""
""

""
""

HC- E- Deposit Liabilities
""

""

""

Non-interest bearing deposits

BHCB 2210

""

""

""

MMD & other savings accounts

BHCB 2389

""

""

""

Time deposits <$100,000

BHCB 6648

HC-K- Quarterly Averages

Total assets

BHCK 3368

HC- L- Derivatives and Off Balance Sheet Items

Gross notional interest rate derivatives held for trading

BHCKA126

""

""

""

Gross notional foreign exchange derivatives held for trading

BHCKA127

""

""

""

Gross notional equity derivatives held for trading

BHCK 8723

""

""

""

Gross notional commodity derivatives held for trading

BHCK 8724

""

""

""

Gross notional interest rate derivatives non-trading

BHCK 8725

""

""

""

Gross notional foreign exchange derivatives non-trading

BHCK 8726

""

""

""

Gross notional equity derivatives non-trading

BHCK 8727

""

""

""

Gross notional commodity derivatives non-trading

BHCK 8728

Tier 1 risk based capital ratio

BHCK 7206

HC- R- Regulatory Capital

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago website
https://www.chicagofed.org/applications/bhc_data/bhcdata_index.cfm last accessed on 9/20/12.
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